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By Roland Mangold NIMA Commission Finds Agency Short-changed
The exercise currently involving the U.S military in Afghanistan is likely to highlight both shortfalls and successes of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). The efficacy of precision-bombing campaigns, as well as incursions by ground troops and Special Forces into Afghanistan, depends upon the quality of products developed by NIMA. The value of this intelligence to the U.S. military is nearly incalculable, yet in proportion to its importance the agency is woefully under-funded. In fairness to whatever failures might be attributable to NIMA, the agency can hardly be held responsible given the findings of the NIMA Commission.
In late fall 1999, realizing that the design and acquisition of Future Imagery Architecture (FIA) had sorely neglected the value-adding systems and processes known collectively as "TPED"- the tasking, processing, exploitation and dissemination of reconnaissance satellite imagery - Congress requested that the Secretary of Defense and the director of the CIA form a review commission.
This commission confirmed the charge that the intelligence community is "collection-centric," thinking first of developing and operating sophisticated technical systems such as reconnaissance satellites and, only as an afterthought, processing, exploiting and disseminating these collected products. The NIMA Commission (www.nimacommission.com) uncovered numerous issues that needed addressing in order for the agency to fulfill its mandate.
"NIMA is attempting to modernize all [its] systems simultaneously - anticipating the FIA - with high-caliber systems engineering and acquisition personnel in dangerously short supply both in NIMA and in the intelligence community at large." The commission acknowledged the Herculean task to modernize despite severe resource constraints, while simultaneously attempting to satisfy increased demand for its basic products.
The decline in expertise within its imagery analyst corps jeopardizes NIMA's ability to support its customers. While not limited to NIMA, this downturn in analytical expertise is due both to the loss of experienced people and to the fewer number of years of experience of the newly hired.
The commission charged, "Not yet taking maximum advantage of commercial hardware and software, NIMA appears to depend heavily upon existing processes and products and persists in developing government standards that diverge from emerging commercial standards.
"The FIA requirements process expressed considerable demand for commercial imagery, and there is considerable additional latent demand in the field, both of which are seriously attenuated by the fact that national technical means (NTM) appears to be a free good, while buying commercial imagery means trading off against beans and boots and bullets. NIMA's commercial imagery strategy is lackluster, and the larger U.S. strategy to commercialize remote sensing is as yet unrealized due largely to the intelligence community's and DOD's reticence," the report also stated.
Competition for resources between the Department of Defense (DOD) and non-DOD users of intelligence, borders on the unhealthy. The report also pointed out that "positive leadership must be exerted jointly and sincerely by the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs, and the director of the CIA, who must first reconcile any differences between and among themselves. NIMA, itself, must be more attuned to impending imbalances."
The report went on to show that NIMA is severely under-funded given its expanding mission, and that there is "considerable disagreement as to the fount from which the needed resources should spring, and incessant caviling about whether NIMA, as currently constituted, is capable of efficiently executing the funds that it surely requires."
The commission concluded that, "although some progress has been made, the promise of converging mapping with imagery exploitation into a unified geospatial information service is yet to be realized, and NIMA continues to experience 'legacy' problems, both in systems and in staff. Admittedly, these problems are not of NIMA's making-it inherited two disparate cultures, an expanding mission, and inadequate resources. Notwithstanding, the commission believes that timely development of a robust geospatial information system (GIS) is critical to achieving national security objectives in the 21st century."
The commission filed its report earlier this year, long before the terrorist attacks on September 11 and the resultant U.S. military action in Afghanistan. At this critical juncture, it may be appropriate to explore what, if any, progress has been made in the wake of the NIMA Commission's findings. Questions obviously arise, including, "Have any of the issues raised by the NIMA Commission been addressed?" "What, if any, action items have resulted from the commission's report?" "How have the Sept 11 attacks affected NIMA, its work flow, and its ability to meet its mandate?" "Has any of the emergency funding found its way to NIMA and, if so, where?" "Are funds being applied to short-term tactical measures, or are they being used to address strategic or long-term objectives?"
NIMA is extremely important to this country and our national security. Its impact on the geospatial industry is equally profound. In upcoming issues of EOM we will look for answers to the aforementioned questions and document the emergence of NIMA as a vital agency in the U.S. government, as well as to this industry. Until next time... Cheers!
Roland Mangold
Publisher
Earth Observation Magazine
E-mail: [email protected] Back |
